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THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIvE JURISPRIT-
DENcE. By K. N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel. Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1941. Pp. x, 360. $3.00.
JUST how much "illumination of modern law by a primitive problem", ,or
"of the primitive by the modern" (p. 44), may be said to shine from this
cooperative study of the law-ways of the Cheyenne Indians by a lawyer and
an anthropologist, I am not qualified to judge. It appears to be the mi.t
competent case study of a body of primitive law yet produced and, as such,
should occupy an important place in the literature of anthropology. Lawyers,
I should suppose, would have only an amused interest in Two Twists v.
Red Robe, or People v. Cries Yia Eya. Llewellyn and Hoebel have emerged
from their study with the highest respect for Cheyenne legal genius. They
are convinced that the Cheyennes are outstanding in this respect among
primitive peoples and perhaps among all peoples. They seem to show up
well even in comparison with the Romans, although this judgment may be
subject to revision. Fifty-three cases, however authentic, do not constitute
a very large number. As the authors say (p. 312), "Perhaps the legal life
of Rome was in fact as full of third-raters who were as frequently muddled
and many-minded in their legal intuitions as any double-hundred of American
judges . . ." But this may also have been true of the Cheyennes. The
authors themselves remark (p. ix) that they "did not expect, or even suspect,
the juristic beauty which Cheyenne work was to reveal . . ." Might not
an equally searching study of other peoples reveal similarly unsuspected
genius? I have read The Chcycne Wa, with the greatest excitement, but
the cause of my excitement is the legal intuitions not of the Cheyennes but
of the authors.
In the judgment of a student of economic theory the significance of this
book goes beyond social anthropology, and even beyond the law, to the
problem with which all students of society in all its aspects are necessarily
engaged: the problem of value. This is no accident. In determining (p. viii)
to view their material not merely in terms of "correct legal doctrine", but
"even more as a study of men in conflict, institutions in tension, and laymen
or craftsmen at work on resolution of tension," and most of all "to see it
also in its working relation to *social science at large," the authors have
addressed themselves knowingly to the problem which is the crux of all
social studies, and in doing so they have made a very important discovery.
Our time will some day be known as the period of nihilism in social think-
ing. Ever since the impact of scientific objectivity upon naive moralism
began to be felt, about a generation ago, we have been caught on the horns
of a dilemma. All the moral standards, all the criteria of social value which
have necessarily guided the social thinking of the past have lately been identi-
fied as "mores", and as such are wholly devoid of any general significance.
But social thinking must have general significance. If we can say of democ-
racy, for instance, only that it is our traditional way of life and one which
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we therefore like, we are indeed intellectually bankrupt. And in the cold
hard light of scientific objectivity, what more can we say?
To a student of social theory this is the significance of the issue which
has divided students of law. Criticism of the legal dogmas of the past has
resulted in a theory of law as the expression of the social opinion of the com-
munity and generation whose law it is. But if law has no moorings save
those of social opinion, it is indeed adrift. It is even unintelligible. As the
present authors say (p. 20), "Without the purpose attribute, law is un-
thinkable."
This is of course true of all social principles, and since society does
actually exist and does maintain some sort of continuity as a going concern,
it is becoming obvious that our social analysis has overlooked something.
The question is, what? At this point the most important discovery of our
time is just beginning to come through. "Law", our present authors say
(p. 20), "has as one of its main purposes to make men go round in more
or less clear ways," and to some extent actually does so. What does this
mean? What do lawyers mean by "juristic beauty"? Evidently something
quite distinct from the mores-content of the law, something which can be
perceived, judged and approved without reference to the mores-norms of
the people whose law it is. Furthermore "juristic method" is often at odds
with the mores of the community from which, purportedly, its sanction is
derived. As the authors remark (p. 27), "The techniques of use of any
legal form or rule are, if anything, more important . . . and commonly
cut further into the nature of a society's legal system than does the 'law'
itself." In short, the "range and clarity" (p. 49) of the law conceived as an
instrument for getting things done constitutes a criterion of value not only
distinct from mores-norms of what is to be got done but superior to them.
It is "the recognized form which limits at once arbitrariness, passion, and
vision, and the underlying function of justice and social wisdom, to serve
which the form first came into being" (p. 27).
The superior validity of "juristic method" over the mores-content of the
law of which the method is purportedly a mere agent is of course due to
the "instrumental" (Dewey) or "technological" (Veblen) continuity of the
law. Mores there are. "The supernatural aspect" and "mystic flavor" of
the law cannot "be belittled or . . . regarded merely, or a priori, as a late
priestly intrusion" (pp. 57, 58). But this sort of thing, as we have now learned
albeit reluctantly and tardily, is self-limiting and parochial, whereas the law
as an instrument is perforce the instrtiment of "the great Entirety" (p. 27).
It cannot avoid linking together all the discrepant subgroups into one com-
munity and divergent generations into a civilization, and so imposing its
standards of range and clarity upon all. Mores to the contrary notwith-
standing, all civilization is continuous.
The superior validity of method over content is going to be a hard lesson
to learn, especially for lawyers. The legal profession like all the other pro-
fessions stems from humble beginnings. Conscious of their inferior status
as artisans of pen and ink, jurisconsults throughout the ages have been
humbly content to hedge their arrangements with the divinities by which
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their betters purported at the moment to be hedged, and it is going to
come bard for them to put their art above authority. But we may discover
shortly that we have already gone a long way in that direction without
knowing it. The superiority of law to men has been suspected all along.
It is only with regard to the ground of that superiority that we have been
mistaken. *What we have to realize now is only that lav is law not because
it is a glimpse of infinite wisdom but because it is a creation of human
skill and as such shares the continuity of skill, the range and clarity of the
ingenious devices by virtue of which, in spite of all the outrageous follies
and dismal pretensions of one set of upstart mores after another, mankind
has nevertheless contrived to survive and multiply and to dominate his
habitat more completely than ever before.
To this realization Llewellyn and Hoebel have made a brilliant contri-
bution. Without any thought of gainsaying the lesson of "mores" they have
nevertheless seen (p. 275) how "slippery" such concepts are, how "they
fuse and confuse the notion of 'practise' . . . with the notion of 'standard'
• ."; how "'juristic method' spreads itself over the whole of law-stuff"
(pp. 298, 299), over the work of the judge in an appellate court but also
"over such other matters as reform legislation, the handling of administra-
tive trouble-cases, the speedy and accurate disposition of disputes of fact,
the 'treatment' phases of criminal lav administration, the legal scholar's job
of reformulating concepts adequate to make a moving body of doctrine
effectively manipulable, the job, where party-advocacy is the way of the
law, of getting advocates' skill on the two sides reasonably balanced"; how
"juristic method sums up at once man's achievement and man's quest in
matters legal" (p. 307).
All this is of course not entirely unexpected. The discovery that the
principle of "juristic method" and the "realistic jurisprudence" to which it
leads offer a way out of the nihilism into which legal sociology had been
forced by objective criticism of legal dogma comes as no surprise to readers
of Llewellyn's studies and those of his collaborators in this and other journals
of the law. Certainly it will be no novelty to students of cultural anthro-
pology, from which Veblen derived the principle of technological dynamic,
and by which even Dewey's instrumental logic has been considerably in-
fluenced. But we are moving slowly, as perhaps we ought in matters of
such portent. The fact that the principle of value-analysis which we are
now engaged in formulating offers hope of a scientific solution of the problem
that is basic to the whole range of social studies, therefore, means that we
must examine this principle with the greatest care and test it as extensively
as possible. It is for this reason that the triumphant emergence of the
method-principle from the careful and convincing tests to which Llewellyn
and Hoebel have here subjected it constitutes a major contribution not only
to social anthropology and the sociology of law but to social science at large.
C. E. AYREst
tProfessor of Economics, University of Te.,ms
1942]
THE YAILE LAW JOURNAL
TiE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERS. By Raymond Vernon.
New York University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi, 152. $2.00.
"IN the public interest or for the protection of investors"! Perhaps no
phrase has been found more frequently in the successive waves of legislation
which, since 1933, have been depositing upon our shores manna with which
to nourish a society weakened by a preceding decade of high finance. It is
a phrase which has enabled Congress to delegate the diagnosis and treat-
ment of untoward economic phenomena to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or kindred administrative agencies - a phrase which, although
it might have been challenged as too indefinite a few years back, is today
sanctioned by a wealth of judicial and legislative precedent.
It is therefore reassuring that in The Regulation of Stock Exchange
Members a staff-member of the commission which is the supreme custodian
of our financial mores has attacked the elusive problem of stock-exchange
regulation with no a priori assurance of the inevitability of his conclusions, and
with a frank recognition that the Congressional mandate to formulate such
rules and regulations as may be "in the public interest or for the protection
of investors" has posed many problems and answered few. Mr. Vernon
goes further. He recognizes that "some undertakings, though apparently in
the interest of the public as a whole, may appear to eliminate existing safe-
guards which protect the individual investor; or an act designed to afford
the investor some additional protection may appear to run counter to the
public interest."
This approach results in a study which has balance and clarity as well
as keen analysis. Mr. Vernon postulates that regulation of the securities
markets has been predicated first, on a concern for the national economy as
a whole- the "public interest"; second, on a concern for the individual
investor of whom "unfair advantage" has been or may be taken. The first
concern has manifested itself in regulations designed to minimize the un-
settling effect of stock-market movements upon our general economy, through
the outlawing of manipulation, the elimination of "excessive speculation"
and the curbing of borrowing, for market purposes, by brokers and their
customers. The second has dealt with the complaints of the individual "who
entrusts his fortunes to the marketplace" rather than with our economy as
a whole. The author believes that alleged or actual conflicts between the
interests of individual investors and the economy at large, or between dif-
ferent economic groups, plague and challenge the conscientious administrator.
Premising his approach to the problem of appraisal of such conflicts upon
the importance of the role which the regulation of stock exchange members
has played in stock-market regulation, he devotes himself to a study of the
nature of certain types of members' activities.
The activities selected for analysis are lending and borrowing by members
and member firms, trading by members as specialists on the floor of the
exchange, and trading by members for their own account, exclusive of their
transactions as specialists. A separate chapter is devoted to each of these
subjects.
In these chapters, dealing with members' activities, Mr. Vernon brings to-
gether a valuable distillation of such data as the fact-collecting forces of the
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exchanges and the Commission have assembled relating to members' lending
and borrowing, trading by specialists, and trading by members otherwise
than as specialists. However, except with respect to the question of pro-
tection of customer's funds and securities from the recklessness or defalcations
of his broker, it is Mr. VTernon's conclusion that the assembling of further
significant data on almost every front is required. Until such data is obtained
there can be no final judgment on what goals must be achieved and what
changes in present regulations must be made.
The case for margin regulation, for example, has been rested upon charges
of the dislocation of credit supply brought about by margin trading, the
resultant instability of stock prices, the need for customer protection, and
the value of suppressing certain types of speculation. Yet it appears that
there is a dearth of basic data required to evaluate these charges, isolate the
goals of regulation, and reconcile possibly conflicting objectives. Similarly,
as to the regulation of the exchange member as a specialist, various studies
are suggested. These studies include a survey of the specialist's function of
"stopping stock", an inquiry into the principal source of the specialist's profits,
an examination of the specialist's transactions in each of a group of issues at
the opening and of the relation of such transactions to over-night price
changes, to the nature and volume of orders executed at the opening by the
specialist for his customers, and to price movement of the stock and the
specialist's trading in the hours following the opening. Of even greater sig-
nificance, it is urged, would be an appraisal of the behavior of specialists in
different types of issues, e.g., volatile and sluggish, active and inactive, low-
priced and high-priced. Such an appraisal, the author believes, would develop
a clue to the many contradictory generalizations regarding the "character-
istic" behavior of specialists.
Indeed, were it not for the increasing demands of war on man-power in
government and finance, one would find it difficult, after a reading of Mr.
Vernon's study, to share the view of the securities industry, recently urged
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and ad-
vanced as early as July, 1941, that the Commission should give no further
study to the problem of segregation - a problem which of course includes the
specialist's dealer activities. On the other hand, the Commission, despite
seven years of stock-exchange regulation and continuous study of the spe-
cialist problem, has not seen fit to exercise its power to compel segregation
of broker and dealer functions by specialists or others in the securities
business. This fact, as well as the insufficiency of data presently available,
compels the conclusion that the industry may with good reason urge that
the Commission's present power by regulation to prevent specialists from
acting as dealers be limited to a power to restrict dealings by a specialist
"so far as practicable to those reasonably necessary to permit him to main-
tain a fair and orderly market."
The larger problem of segregation, particularly as it pertains to the (jver-
the-counter market, is one which 1r. Vernon leaves untouched, as well
as other equally vital problems such as the impingement of stock-exchange
regulation upon over-the-counter regulation and that thorny, gingerly dealt-
with concomitant of primary and secondary distribution, the process of "peg-
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ging, fixing and stabilizing". This deliberate narrowing of the field, how-
ever, permits the author to focus on detail in a manner which a more am-
bitious approach might have prevented.
In his concluding chapter Mr. Vernon seeks to formulate principles by
which the Commission may be guided "in reconciling the interests of the
public with those of the individual and in reconciling various aspects of the
public interest with one another."
These principles, the author suggests, stem from the Congressional ob-
jective of a "fair" and "orderly" market. A "fair" market is one in which
the individual investor need not fear for the integrity of his broker, the
safety of his funds or the possibility that price movements are being arti-
ficially controlled. An "orderly" market connotes one which lacks "sudden
and -unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of securities" and hence makes
no "unnecessary adverse contribution to the stability and well-being of the
public at large." Although one may question whether the "fair" and "orderly"
market concepts do more than reflect what is implicit in the catch-phrases,
"protection of investors" and "public interest", they are undoubtedly more
tangible and hence serve the more effectively as analytic agents in dealing
with particular problems of the securities markets. It is Mr. Vernon's thesis
that if it were to be determined that an existing institution of exchange
practice-for example, the institution of the specialist -is of benefit to
the maintenance of an orderly market, but nevertheless is clearly unfair
to the individual investor, the institution should be supplanted by another
which would be free from so unfortunate a by-product. Probably few
would challenge this evaluation of relative interests; but one might pause,
as I believe Mr. Vernon himself would, before jumping to the conclusion
that an institution which suffers from some popular disfavor is forth-
with to be cast out. In token of this, Mr. Vernon states that in the achieve-
ment of an "orderly" market, even where no elements of "unfairness" to
investors are evident, there has been a too ready prejudice against various
types of speculative trading, particularly where in the past such types of
trading have been hallmarks of manipulation and runaway markets. Regu-
lation may itself have consequences upon particular types of speculation and
speculative devices which are not clearly known. Accordingly, many prob-
lems of stock-market regulation, including the regulation of floor trading,
specialists' trading and margin trading, and such devices as stop-loss orders
and short sales, should be approached with the question: What contribution
does such trading make to the stability and orderliness of stock-price move-
ments ?
This viewpoint is suggested, rather than developed, in Mr. Vernon's last
few pages. One cannot but wish that, despite the need for further data, he
had undertaken to illustrate more exhaustively than he did the application
of his proposed principle to specific problems. For in doing so, one might
discover pitfalls in such seemingly certain concepts as market "stability" and
"orderliness". Furthermore, in such exploration one might discover a further
constituent of an "orderly" market. I have in mind the public interest in
a "good" or "adequate" market, a concept which is directed not to volume,
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or to price movement, but to the narrowness of the spread at any particular
time between the bid and asked prices of a particular security.
However, it is easy for the beggar to ask for more. We can accept grate-
fully the contribution which Mr. Vernon has made to a difficult subject,
and can recognize that his study is one which, at least when our democratic
society renews its introspective processes, should stimulate fruitful inquiry,
and which in the meantime may further the intelligent and careful regulation
of a dlicate portion of our economic machine.
ALLEN E. TIRooPt
REGULATION OF PIPE LINES As Co MoN CARRIERS. By William Beard.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. x, 184. !2.00.
TnE pipe-line transportation of oil and gas presents problems that are
complex and difficult to understand. Those problems are not easily grasped
by many technologists, let alone laymen and law makers, and most of the
literature on the subject is of a lengthy technical or highly involved nature.
It is generally the work of governmental investigating committees or of
academicians offering dissertations on the governmental attitude toward
real or threatened regulation of the pipe lines. A few popular books cover-
ing this subject, such as Ida Tarbell's History of the Standard Oil Company
and Henry Demarest Lloyd's Urealth Against Commonwealth, treat con-
vincingly and admirably the abuses in pipe-line transportation, but none of
the works, whether by crusaders, governmental investigators or private-
interest technologists covers this subject in a concise objective manner to
give the reader a broad and intelligent perspective of an intricate subject.
William Beard's little book does just this, but only insofar as pipe lines are
or are not common carriers. The common carrier aspect of pipe lines is
only one of many problems in this field. For instance, there is the shipper-
ownership or "commodities-clause" aspect to which Beard gives little space.
There is the "rate-equalization" aspect, and the "government ownership"
aspect, and many others which Mr. Beard either does not touch or does
not dwell upon at any significant length. But 'Mr. Beard does not profess
to cover the entire field of pipe-line transportation; he has restricted him-
self to pipe lines as common carriers. And in this particular field he has
written a book of principles which is by far the best in its field and which
no one interested in pipe-line transportation can afford to be without.
Although the book was completed early in 1941 and the preparation of it
begun much earlier, it is more timely today than when it was completed.
This timeliness is due to the fact that since January, 1941, pipe-line trans-
portation has been faced with many political and national-defense problems.
Beginning in the latter part of March, 1941, the so-called "Cole" committee
i-General Counsel for Trustees, Associated Gas & Electric Corp.
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investigating the petroleum industry held extensive bearings relative to trans-
portation by pipe lines for national-defense purposes. In August, the so-
called "Maloney" committee of the United States Senate began hearings on
oil transportation problems. And most important of all, on December 23,
1941, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice succeeded in
obtaining a final judgment against most of the major pipe-line companies
of the United States, as a result of a complaint charging violation of the
Elkins Act which forbids transportation rebates to shippers. Completion
of the book before these important Congressional hearings and before the
"Pipe-line Rebate" suit was settled does not mean that Mr. Beard's book
is deficient for lack of the case histories which these later events afford. It
merely means that in the light of these events Mr. Beard's book of principles
is more timely.
Mr. Beard sums up the pipe-line problem admirably, when he writes:
Running through the mass of regulatory theory and practice
. . . are two prime conceptions. One is that pipe lines of the type
considered here may be treated primarily as public transportation
agencies, moving freight in competition with carriers by rail and
water. The other is that they may be handled primarily as major
plant facilities forming an integral part of the machinery whereby
oil, gas, and other fluids are removed from the earth, conveyed,
processed. and distributed. The type of treatment which the pipe
lines should receive depends upon which of these views . . . 'seems
to be the more appropriate from the standpoint of national economy
and policy.
In general, the transportation view has predominated as a public policy while
the plant-integration view has been held by practically all of the major oil
companies, particularly the Standard Oil interests. The transportation view-
point calls for public regulation; the plant-integration viewpoint is antag-
onistic to such regulation. So successfullyhas the latter viewpoint been up-
held by the private interests owning the pipe lines that although tens of
thousands of miles of pipe lines serving the petroleum industry have become
common carriers on paper, they are only to a very limited extent common
carriers in fact.
Finally, the author proposes the question, "which view should prevail?"
Mr. Beard answers: "Considering the total situation . . . it is probable
that the vertical (plant-facility) principle could be universally applied in
practice with fewer changes in structure than would be required to make
the common carrier plan genuinely effective." Mr. Beard wisely does not
give a positive answer nor even hint which of the views he favors. He does,
however, in a diplomatic and scholarly manner point out the good and bad
points of each view, leaving it to the reader which course he would care
to follow. At the end of the book, however, Mr. Beard writes: "There are
certain other advantages inherent in the plan of regulating entire mineral
industries as public utilities," and from what he says in the few lines there-
after, I am inclined to think Mr. Beard favors this course.
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Mr. Beard begins his book by explaining and defining the field of interest.
Next, he traces the origin of common carrier legislation. Then lie explains
the nature and extent of the comnmon carrier status for pipe lines. He treats
rate regulation and service regulation, considers forms of control over pipe
line affiliations and the coordination of pipe lines with other forms of trans-
portation, and ends with a summary and conclusions. The book contains a
table of pipe-line cases (unfortunately undated) and an index. Lack of a
bibliography may be a handicap to some readers but this deficiency is partly
made up by good and numerous footnotes.
In all, the book shows excellent research and unusual powers of getting
down to basic principles in few words. The work is remarkably objective
considering the character of most of the sources consulted. The only un-
fortunate circumstance, which might have led to more emphasis on the plight
of the "independent" and the position of the consumer under existing con-
ditions of pipe-line regulation, is that neither the hearings before the Tem-
porary National Economic Committee in 1940 nor the results of the more
recent pipe-line case, United States v. Atlantic Refining Company' (December
23, 1941) were available to the author.
WILLIAM J. KEMINITZERt*
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TIE TERRITORY OF MfICIiiiAU ,
1825-1836. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1940. Two
vols. Pp. liii, 610; 482.
THESE two volumes conclude the six-volume series edited by Professor
William Wirt Blume mad complete the publication of the records of the Su-
preme Court of Michigan Territory previously reviewed in this Journal.i As
with the previous volumes in the series, numerous scholarly aids and appa-
ratus for studying the transactions of the court have been provided, including
calendars of cases and papers, a roll of attorneys, an index to naturalization
proceedings (fifty-five persons took the oath during this period), an index
digest of decisions and opinions, and indices both to pleading and practice
forms and to names of persons mentioned in the records.
The period covered by these volumes is marked by a rapidly increasing
population and an ever-expanding frontier. The number of organized coun-
ties increased from seven in 1820 to twenty-six by 1835, and, owing to the
strain upon the judicial machinery, the Supreme Court with its one annual
term held at one place was inadequate to meet the needs of the many new
communities. To meet this situation circuit courts were set up. In the final
reorganization of the judicial system of Michigan Territory in 1833, thirteen
of the fourteen counties east of Lake Michigan were put into one judicial
circuit and provision made for the appointment of a circuit judge. This judge
and two associate judges appointed for each county were required to hold a
1. U. S. Dist. Ct, Dist. Col.
IEconomist and Geologist.
1. (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 374.
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court in each county twice a year. The circuit court for Wayne County con-
tinued to be held by the judges of the Supreme Court under the provisions
of the act of 1828. The superior circuit courts were purely appellate courts,
and their decisions were never reviewed by the Supreme Court of the ter-
ritory. Under this plan the highest judges of the territory were required to
exercise their power of review at various places throughout the eastern por-
tion of the territory-a rather arduous task for the judges but a great con-
venience to lawyers and litigants. In his introduction Professor Blume pains-
takingly reviews the jurisdictional and political problems which beset the
court in the concluding years of its history. The relationship of the court's
business to the social history of the territory is, on the other hand, completely
ignored.
The indefatigable editor has provided a valuable analysis of the business
of the Supreme Court from its organization in 1805 until 1836, when its
territorial business was finally concluded. 'As might be expected, about sev-
enty-five per cent of its business was on the common law side, and admiralty
cases actually exceeded those heard in equity. Of the ordinary civil actions
at law, assumpit exceeded debt 544 to 164. Of suits in equity, actions to fore-
close mortgages were followed in frequency by suits to restrain proceedings
at law and actions to compel conveyance of land, in more than half of which
cases the relief sought was specific performance. Characteristic of a frontier
area are the criminal statistics. Indictments for crimes against the person
exceeded those for crimes against property. Actually there were only twenty-
two larceny indictments and seven complaints and commitments for that of-
fense and four indictments and one complaint for receiving stolen goods as
against seventy-seven indictments or commitments for assault and assault
and battery. There is even one indictment for challenging to a duel and one
for encouraging duelling.
In 1819 the Supreme Court placed causes of divorce and alimony on the
separate equity docket. The Code of 1827 authorized application "to chancery
for a divorce", but this was repealed in 1832 by an act which provided for
jury trials and for the commencement of divorce proceedings by "petition".
From this time divorce proceedings were no longer classified as chancery
business. Altogether twenty-two divorces were commenced in the Supreme
Court in this period, and as many as seventeen divorces were granted by the
Legislative Council in the more limited period, 1828-31.
The previous volumes had offered considerable evidence of a large-scale
reception of English law. As the century advanced the hold of the common
law upon the territory became even stronger. There is at least one notable
exception to this trend. The com mon law rule that an action of trover may
be maintained by an executor but not against him, as it was in form a tort
but in substance an action to try property, was not sustained by the court
in a divided decision in 1828, in Lariviere v. Campau, Administrator,2 in which
the majority of the court asserted the rather startling dictum, as noted by
Judge Woodward, that "by the revolution, the Com. Law was lopped off."
The Statute of 4 EDW. III, authorizing an executor to maintain an action of
2. Pp. 305-13 (1828).
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trespass for chattels taken and carried away in the lifetime of his testator,
was held by the court, curiously enough, to be "introductive of new law" and
therefore not in force in Michigan, even though it was a widely accepted view
that statutes passed in England prior to colonization became a part of the
common law in operation in this country. judge Sibley, by vmy of refuta-
tion, asserted that the common law was given to the territory by the urdi-
nance of 1787 and that the date of that ordinance was "the point of time at
which we must enquire, what was the Common Law." A little later in hik
opinion he speaks of the law guaranteed by the ordinance as the common law
"understood and admitted to be in force on the day these United States de-
clared themselves independent of the British Crown, and ceased to be Cl-
onies and a part of the British Empire." Most persuasive was his contention:
"I do not Consider it material, in what way the principles of the
C. Law have been settled, Whether by usages, custom, statute or
Judicial decissions [sic] of Court - In whatever mode a change has
been accomplished, is in my view, so 1' ing as the change has been
acquiesced in, a part of the Com. Law in a modified and improved
state."
While Sibley appears somewhat muddled on the question of the terminal (late
of the common law, logic and simple justice would sustain his minority opin-
ion.
RIcHARD B. MORRIus t
Los MODOS DE INICIACI6N DEL CONTRALOR JUDICIAL DE LA CONSTITUCION-
ALIDAD DE LAS LEYES EN LOS EsAmnos UNiDos. By George H. Jaffin.
Los MODoS DE INIcrAcI6N DEL CONTRALOR JUDICIAL DE LA CONSrITUCION-
ALIDAD DE LAS LEYES EN LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA. By Dr. Roberto
Pecach. Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Revista Universitaria "Juridicas
y Sociales", 1939. Pp. 45.
EVOLUCAO DO CONTROLE JURISDICIONAL DA COINSTITUCIONALIDADE DAS LEis
Nos EsTAnos UNmos. By George H. Jaffin.
A EVOLUCAO DO CONTROLE DA CONSTITUCIONALIDADE DAS LEIs No Bm sm.
By Cindido Mlota Filho. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Naqional, 1941. Pp. 20.
THESE studies of comparative law present a useful method of approach.
Mr. Jaffin of the Securities and Exchange Commission has written a useful
article on the modes of challenging the constitutionality of legislation in the
United States. This article was then translated into Spanish and Portuguese
and stimulated the writing of a parallel article by an Argentinian and a
Brazilian jurist on judicial review in his country. It is evident that in both
Argentina and Brazil judicial control lags considerably behind the highly
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developed institution in the United States, where it had historical and proce-
dural origins indigenous to countries of the common law. Both Dr. Pecach
and Professor Candido Mota express admiration for the United States sys-
tem, and indicate to how great an extent American decisions are cited in
Argentina and Brazil. The Brazilian Constitution of 1937 marks consider-
able progress in the direction of United States practice. Dr. Pecach, while
noting the narrower extent of judicial control in that country, proposes for
Argentina a legislative reform to enable legislation to be challenged by in-
junction or declaratory judgment. An injunction against public officials on
the ground of unconstitutionality of the authorizing statute is unknown in
Argentina and seems not to be recommended by Dr. Pecach. It would help
the study of comparative constitutional law if the Spanish and Brazilian con-
tributions at least were translated into English.
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